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for innovation to be conducted by specialized firms: Specialization mitigates the two-tier
agency problem of providing simultaneously the right kinds of incentives for researchers and
executives. If capital markets are sufficiently imperfect, it is optimal for innovation to be
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1 Introduction
One of the major developments in U.S. capital markets in the recent decades has been the dra-
matic growth of the venture capital industry: While the amount of funds committed to venture
capital was less than half a billion in 1978, it has risen over $30 billion by 2007, with a peak of
about $100 billion in 2000 (in 2002 dollars). This change was spurred in large part by the Depart-
ment of Labor’s 1979 decision to relax the “Prudent Man Rule”, which had previously obstructed
pension funds from investing substantial amounts of money in high-risk start-up ventures. Since
then venture funds have been behind many of the exceptionally innovative companies, including
Cisco, Genentech, and Google. Nonetheless, substantial amount of innovation still occurs within
large corporations such as IBM, Merck, and Microsoft. These observations raise the following
questions that are at the heart of this paper: First, what are the forces that determine when inno-
vation is undertaken by young and small companies and when by established large corporations?
In particular, how do developments in capital markets such as the growth of venture capital affect
how innovative activity is organized? Second, what is the role of policy in spurring innovation?
In order to answer these questions, one must first determine what makes venture organiza-
tions different from large corporations in funding innovation. This will, in turn, determine how
capital will be allocated by investors between these institutions. It is important to note that when
supplying their capital to venture firms or large corporations, investors face a multi-tier agency
problem: They must provide simultaneously the right kinds of incentives for managers (e.g. top
executives in large corporations and/or venture firms) and their subordinates (e.g. researchers
and/or entrepreneurs). The severity of this agency problem, in turn, is determined in large part by
organizational features of these institutions. The differential degrees of agency problems faced by
investors when supplying their capital to these institutions are thus a major theme of this paper.
In this paper, I argue that a key function and a distinctive feature of venture financing is that it
allows specialization in innovative activities. Put differently, venture financing makes the estab-
lishment of specialized research companies, which would otherwise make substantial short-run
losses, possible. By contrast, large corporations are diverse: they conduct many productive ac-
tivities such as manufacturing and sales alongside with innovative activities. Both specialization
and diversity have their bright as well as dark sides. In this paper, I focus on two key dimensions.
On the bright side, diversity may allow a corporation to overcome capital market imperfections
as the headquarters have the ability to redistribute funds from units with surplus funds to those
units that are in need of funds. This mechanism is likely to be especially valuable in the context
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of innovation, as R&D requires substantial financial resources early on without generating cash
flows for a long time. On the dark side, proliferation of activities under the same roof may in-
troduce additional agency problems between investors and the top managers of a corporation, as
managers may inflate costs and shift revenues across activities. While specialization in the form
of small firms carrying out stand-alone projects has the potential to mitigate multi-tier agency
problems that may otherwise plague large corporations, it requires that capital markets be suffi-
ciently developed (or perfect), in the sense of allowing firms to make short-run losses so long as
they promise to generate satisfactory returns in the future.
The formal question I am after in this paper can then be formulated as follows: What are the
costs and benefits of specialization in research environments with multi-tier agency problems?
And, how do the developments in capital markets such as the growth of venture capital affect
these costs and benefits and hence the choice of organizational form?
To answer this question, I develop a theoretical model in which development of new tech-
nologies and products requires the collaboration of investors, managers, and workers. Investors
provide funds. Managers can find talented workers and supervise them, but lack funds. Thus,
investors delegate this task to managers. Workers are either research workers (scientists) or or-
dinary production workers (production engineers). Managers and scientists (but not production
engineers) are subject to moral hazard: they must be given incentives so as to be induced to
“work hard”. Managers are also potentially subject to a hidden information problem stemming
from their direct involvement in the activities -which can only be imperfectly observed by in-
vestors. As a result, investors face a two-tier agency problem: They must design appropriate
incentive contracts for managers so as to induce them (i) to exert the right amount of effort, (ii)
to write appropriate incentive contracts with their subordinates, and (iii) to reveal the true state
of nature once outcomes are realized.
I then consider two alternative organizational arrangements in which investors can organize
agents and allocate tasks. The first is integration where both research and ordinary production are
carried out under the same management. The second is specialization where research is separated
from ordinary production. The goal is to determine the costs and benefits of specialization under
two scenarios: perfect capital markets vis-a-vis imperfect capital markets.
To identify the benefits of specialization, I abstract from imperfections in capital markets and
focus on the extent of agency problems generated by each of these organizational arrangements.
I find that specialization is characterized by less severe two-tier agency problems and hence is the
preferred mode of organization. This is because when a manager is responsible for both research
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and ordinary production, as would be under integration, he has an incentive to distort reporting
of productivity across activities, and this in turn makes it difficult for investors to simultane-
ously provide the right kinds of incentives for managers and scientists. The key friction under
integration is that investors can only observe the aggregate output from research and ordinary
production, but not the individual output from each activity. This friction makes it impossible for
investors to tailor managers’ compensation to scientists’ performance. This problem disappears
when the two activities are separated.
To identify the costs of specialization, I next introduce capital market imperfections into the
model. To this end, I reinterpret the above static setup as the reduced form of a multiperiod model
where, unlike ordinary production, research does not generate any returns in the first period. This
implies that a (specialized) research firm must rely on external finance in order to operate. By
contrast, an integrated firm is less dependent on external finance as ordinary production revenues
can be used to subsidize research. The key assumption I make here is that the cost of a unit of
capital a firm faces in external capital markets is a decreasing function of the amount of collateral
it can put up in the first period. Since a research firm cannot offer any collateral, it endogenously
faces a higher cost of capital than an integrated firm. I then show that if the difference in the
cost of funds faced by research firms and integrated firms is “sufficiently” large (that is, if capital
markets are sufficiently imperfect), then integration is preferred.
These results have a number of interesting implications. First, all else equal, the division of
innovation between established, large corporations and young, small firms will be determined by
the extent of imperfections in capital markets. Specifically, the more perfect the capital markets,
the greater will be the share of innovation conducted by small, specialized firms. Moreover,
since specialization enhances the productivity of innovation, the aggregate level of innovation
is likely to increase with financial development. An interesting corollary to these statements is
that financial development may pose a threat to incumbent corporations, especially for those in
innovative industries, as innovative ventures are highly dependent on external finance. I argue in
detail later on that these predictions of the model are consistent with the growth of venture capital
and the accompanied explosion of innovation produced by small companies in the U.S. since the
late 1970’s.
Another prediction of the model is that specialization in innovation is more likely to occur in
industries where there is less complementarity between new innovative ideas and existing pro-
duction activities. As such, financial development is likely to increase specialization in such
industries to a greater extent. The prevalence of specialized research firms in frontier industries
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such as biotechnology and information technology, and the fact that a substantial fraction of ven-
ture investments is concentrated in these industries appear to be consistent with this prediction.
The above conclusions also shed light on the role of the Department of Labor’s 1979 policy
shift in spurring innovation: It has freed pension funds to invest in venture capital and this has
translated into a surge in the supply of funds to specialized research firms. The increase in the
supply of funds, in turn, has reduced the cost of external finance, making it easier to establish
such firms. This change potentially has two distinct effects on innovation, one direct and the
other indirect. The direct effect is that many positive net present value innovative projects are
likely to have been won for the economy, which would otherwise not be able find financing. The
indirect effect is that some of the innovative projects that would previously be done inside large
corporations must have moved to small stand-alone companies.1 To the extent that specialization
in innovation is efficiency-enhancing, the policy shift and consequent improvements in capital
markets must have served to increase innovative output in the U.S..
Finally, I should emphasize that although I use my theoretical framework to understand the
explosion of innovation produced by small venture-backed companies in the U.S., it has much
broader applicability. It can also help us understand why some large corporations choose to
spin off units which are focused on R&D: One example is Palm, Inc. which was spun off from
3Com. It can also help us understand why some large companies choose to acquire new tech-
nologies from other companies rather than developing them in-house: A good example is John-
son&Johnson, who has acquired tens of ventured companies including Cordis -the company that
developed a coronary stent, which Johnson&Johnson Company Timeline Website lists as one of
its major new innovations over the past two decades. Even more broadly, my theoretical frame-
work provides one reason why small firms exist despite the financial synergies offered by large
corporations.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 relates the paper to previous research. Section 3
lays out the basic model and determines the preferred mode of organization under the assumption
of perfect capital markets. Section 4 introduces capital market imperfections into the model and
investigates the implications for the choice of organizational form. Section 5 discusses various
theoretical predictions and relates them to available empirical evidence. Section 6 provides a
discussion on the role of policy in improving capital markets and stimulating innovation. Section
7 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
1There is in fact a second and more subtle indirect effect: The impact of venture-backed firm entry on the
innovation incentives of incumbents in the same industry. I discuss this effect in greater detail in Section 6.
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2 Related Literature
This paper is related to several strands of literature. In what follows, I briefly mention only the
most direct linkages. Kortum and Lerner (2000) provide empirical evidence on the relationship
between innovation and venture capital (see, also, Hellmann and Puri, 1998). In particular, they
find that venture capital has accounted for a disproportionate share of innovations between 1983
and 1992, with results likely also holding through 1998. Some observers, e.g. Jensen (1993),
argued that the relative ineffectiveness of corporate research facilities over the past few decades
has been due to agency problems. These papers, however, leave open the question of whether
the key source of venture capitalists’ advantage in funding innovation is the process by which
projects are chosen ex ante or the monitoring and control after the investment is made. My
theoretical framework suggests that they have a greater advantage in the latter dimension.
To develop the model, I draw on the literatures on corporate finance/governance and the
economics of agency. A key aspect of my model is the incentives investors face in providing
their capital to various types of institutions -a major theme in this literature (see Shleifer and
Vishny, 1997, for an excellent survey). This literature highlights, as does this paper, the agency
problems that arise as a result of “separation of financing and management” of firms. The severity
of agency problems, in turn, may itself be endogenous and depends crucially on the organizational
features of institutions (see, for example, Aghion and Tirole, 1997).2 In analyzing the extent of
agency problems generated by various organizational forms, I also benefit from previous work
such as Melumad, Mookherjee, and Reichelstein (1995) and Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo
(1998). Finally, this paper benefits from the literature on the effects of financial imperfections on
real economic activity. Following Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),
among others, I model financial imperfections as a wedge between the cost of external funds and
the opportunity cost of funds generated internally by a firm. In these models, this wedge arises as
a result of low borrower net worth, information asymmetries between the suppliers and borrowers
of capital, or contractual enforcement problems (see Hubbard, 1998, for a useful review).
My paper is closely related to two papers in the theory of the firm. Holmstrom (1989) argues
that the large corporation primarily exists to serve production and marketing goals and that in pur-
suing these goals effectively, it has to organize in a way that compromises innovation incentives.
2There is a related strand of literature that takes the perspective that firms are organized so as to be maximally
efficient at the processing and communication of various types of information (see, for example, Sah and Stiglitz,
1986; Radner, 1993). These papers, however, abstract from agency problems, which are central in this paper.
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Providing incentives for both types of activities within one organization is more costly than pro-
viding them through separate organizations. Rotemberg and Saloner (1994), on the other hand,
argue that firms may wish to avoid being too broad in scope as this may inhibit the provision of
incentives to firms’ employees. For if there are technological “synergies” between different activ-
ities within a firm, such narrowness can help senior management of a firm commit to rewarding
employees for any ideas they may generate, thereby strengthening employees’ ex ante research
incentives. Their model, however, abstracts from agency problems between the suppliers of cap-
ital and senior management, which is a main concern in my model. Also, narrowness is valuable
in their model because contracts are incomplete, whereas in my model it is desirable because it
helps investors overcome informational frictions.
Also closely related is the stream of literature that studies the financing of innovation from
a theoretical perspective. Aghion and Tirole (1994) analyze the organization of R&D in an
incomplete-contracts framework. Anand and Galetovic (2000) study the importance of the strength
(or weakness) of intellectual property rights for a new venture’s choice of financing between ven-
ture capital and corporations. Like them, I highlight the difficulties corporations may face in
funding research ventures, but the mechanisms at work are different. The key friction in their
model is that corporations are unable to commit to sharing profits created by the innovation with
their research employees, whereas in my model it is the inability of top managers of a corpora-
tion to commit to truthfully reveal the true state of nature to the suppliers of capital. Hellmann
(1998) emphasizes the importance of a corporation’s strategic motive for making investments
in entrepreneurial ventures. In his model, corporate financing is preferred when new projects
complement the “core business” of a corporation, and venture financing is preferred if they are
substitutes. In contrast with Hellman, strategic concerns or considerations of complementarity or
substitutability play no role in my model.
Differently from all of these studies, this paper explicitly takes into account the fact that an in-
novative venture typically entails the collaboration of at least three different parties: Suppliers of
funds, agents who use those funds on the suppliers’ behalf (managers), and agents who carry out
the actual innovative task (researchers/entrepreneurs). In doing so, I am able to investigate simul-
taneously the agency problems created by informational asymmetries (i) between the investors
and the firm and (ii) within the firm. Not only do I highlight the multi-tier nature of the agency
relationship that typically characterizes research environments, I also discuss how the form of
this agency relationship is shaped by organizational structure. Given this theoretical framework,
I then investigate how capital market imperfections influence the organization of innovation.
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3 The Basic Model
I consider a multi-level contracting relationship between a principal (the investor) and multiple
agents: Managers, research workers (scientists), and ordinary production workers (production
engineers). The principal is endowed with a large amount of funds and is risk-neutral, whereas
agents have no wealth and are risk-averse. Note that while managers are agents of the investor,
they are principals with respect to the workers.
I divide time into three main stages:
• A startup stage (date t = 0) in which the principal hires managers and makes investments.
• An action stage (date t = 1) in which managers find and hire workers; and workers perform
research and ordinary production activities.
• A payoff stage (date t = 2) in which outcomes are realized.
My analysis focuses mainly on agency problems at date t = 2. These problems potentially
arise in the model because the investor is unable to distinguish a talented worker from an untal-
ented one on his own. Accordingly, she delegates the task of finding talented workers to agents
called managers. The goal is to investigate how the investor can organize agents and design their
initial contracts in order to mitigate agency problems. Before I turn to a description of the mech-
anism design problem, I must specify the technology (i.e. activities), preferences of participants,
information structures, and alternative organizational arrangements. It is important to emphasize
that the information structure endogenously depends on the organizational arrangement.
3.1 Agents and Activities
In what follows, I describe in turn the activities performed by a representative scientist, produc-
tion engineer, and manager.
Research Activity A research activity requires an initial investment of IR > 0 at date t = 0,
and generates a random nonnegative revenue, sR, at date t = 2. The activity is performed by a
single scientist, who expends effort eR ∈ {H,L} (High, Low) at date t = 1 to generate ideas
or make inventions. This effort may entail the search for an improvement in product design,
the investigation of a new method to reduce costs, or the development of a new product. For
simplicity, I assume that a scientist can either succeed (i.e. make an invention) or fail (i.e. no
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invention). The probability of success depends on two factors: the quality of the scientist and
whether he works hard or not. If the scientist is “talented”, then
sR =
{
sR with probability r
0 with probability 1− r,
where sR > 0 is the monetary value of the invention and r ∈ [0, 1). The probability of success r
is an endogenous variable that can take two values, {rH , rL}, where:
• r = rH > 0 if the scientist works hard, and
• r = rL = 0 if he shirks.
Let {ψL, ψH} denote the disutility to the scientist of shirking and working hard, respectively.
Exerting effort is costly so that ψH > ψL, where ψL is normalized to zero. The scientist has a
utility function of the form u(tR)−ψe, where tR is the monetary compensation, and he is strictly
risk-averse (i.e. u′(·) > 0 and u′′(·) < 0). Finally, an “untalented” scientist is assumed to be
never successful for simplicity (i.e. the probability of success rU = 0) and hence sR = 0 with
probability 1.
Ordinary Production Activity An ordinary production activity requires an initial investment
of IP > 0 at date t = 0, and generates a random nonnegative revenue, sP , at date t = 2. The
activity is performed by a single production engineer, who supplies labor to carry out routine tasks
such as adaptation and implementation of new blueprints to existing products and production
processes, manufacturing, and quality control. For simplicity, I assume that production engineers
are of uniform quality and a given engineer is always successful in production, in which case the
monetary outcome of his labor is equal to s > 0. In addition, however, the production engineer
may generate ideas/inventions independently of the scientist, perhaps as a result of learning-by-
doing or pure luck. Thus, the outcome of the production engineer’s labor is given by
sP =
{
s+ sP with probability p
s with probability 1− p,
where sP > s is the value of the invention and p ∈ [0, 1). The engineer has a utility function of
the form u(tP ), is strictly risk-averse, but effort-neutral (i.e. ψH = ψL = ψ and I let ψ = 0).
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A few remarks are in order. First, the assumption that a production engineer may sometimes
come up with valuable ideas seems fairly reasonable and plays a key role in the model (to be
seen shortly). There is considerable evidence that non-research employees do in fact generate
valuable ideas/inventions. As an example, Merges (1999) reports that the San Diego-based Cubic
Corporation’s electronic warfare simulator was invented by a non-research employee, William B.
Marty. Marty was an electronics engineer who, unlike Cubic’s R&D employees, was not “hired
to invent”.3 Indeed, the recognition by employers that non-R&D employees often make inven-
tions has led firms to increasingly require new non-R&D employees to pre-assign any title to
future inventions in their employment contracts, a practice that was traditionally limited to R&D
employees only. Second, in the case where both the scientist and engineer invent, I assume either
that (i) the inventions are identical or that (ii) the inventions, although potentially different, are
worth the same, so that sP = sR ≡ s.4 Thus, the management can implement either inven-
tion with equal revenue outcomes. For concreteness, I assume that when both agents invent the
scientist’s invention is used.
Management Activity A manager performs two functions on behalf of the investor: (i) iden-
tifying and hiring talented workers at date t = 1, and (ii) verifying their work at date t = 2.
The manager’s input in identifying scientists is particularly important because scientists come
in different qualities and only a scientist who is both talented and hard-working has a positive
probability of producing inventions. To capture this point, it is assumed that the manager must
expend effort in order to find a talented scientist. Specifically, I assume that conditional on ex-
erting high effort, the manager can perfectly distinguish a talented scientist from an untalented
one; otherwise, he always ends up with an untalented scientist. Let {ψL, ψH} respectively denote
the disutility of effort of shirking and working hard, where ψH > ψL and ψL = 0 as before. In
contrast, the manager’s hiring effort is less important for ordinary production since production
engineers are of uniform quality. To keep things simple, therefore, I assume that the manager can
3Even very low-level employees sometimes produce inventions. One striking example is that of Peter M. Roberts
who invented the “quick-release” socket wrench in 1963 while working as a clerk at Sears. His invention was a huge
success: It was estimated that by 1978 the socket had generated over $40 million in profits for Sears. For some other
examples of non-research employee inventions, see, for example, Merges (1999) and Sandrock (1983).
4A less restrictive assumption would be to suppose that inventions are random draws from a quality distribution
where inventions of higher quality are associated with higher revenues. The main results of the paper are not sensitive
to this change as long as the quality distributions have the same support. Since the former assumption simplifies
exposition without loss of insight, it is exploited in the remainder of the paper.
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hire a production engineer without effort.5 Once outcomes of research and ordinary production
activities are realized at date t = 2 the manager verifies the outcomes and communicates them to
the investor. Finally, the manager is strictly risk-averse with utility function u(tM)− ψeM , where
tM is the monetary compensation and eM ∈ {L,H} is the effort exerted by the manager.
Without loss of generality, all agents are assumed to have the same reservation utility, u.
Also, I restrict my analysis to parameter values such that principal’s expected profit is positive
only when (i) both research and ordinary production activities are carried out, and at the same
time (ii) both the manager and scientist exert high effort; but is at most zero otherwise.
3.2 Organizational Arrangements
I consider two alternative ways in which the agents can be organized. The first is integrated
arrangement or simply integration where both research and ordinary production are carried out
under the same management. The second is specialized arrangement or simply specialization
where research is separated from ordinary production. I will sometimes refer to a productive unit
with the integrated arrangement as an integrated firm, and one with the specialized arrangement
as a specialized firm. The organizational arrangements are depicted in Figure 1.
 
 
 
 Manager 
 Scientist 
 Investor 
Production Engineer 
 Investor 
 Manager 
 Scientist Production Engineer 
Figure 1: Integration versus Specialization in innovation
Note that since production engineers do not differ in quality or productivity and that hiring a
production engineer does not require managerial effort, I simplify things by letting the investor
hire the production engineer directly under specialization rather than delegating the task to a
manager. This simplification helps me preserve the symmetry in the number of agents present
under each organizational arrangement.
5See Orman (2008) for a version of the present model where (i) production engineers also differ in their quality
and productivity, and (ii) managers must exert effort to hire production engineers as well.
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An economy with the integrated arrangement is meant to represent a (hugely simplified) eco-
nomic environment where innovative activities take place within large corporations alongside
with other activities such as ordinary production, sales etc. An economy with the specialized
arrangement, on the other hand, is meant represent an (extreme) economic environment where
innovative activities can be carried out separately from other activities thanks to the backing of
venture capital firms. I begin with describing the economic environment under the integrated
arrangement and then move on to the case with the specialized arrangement. To keep things sim-
ple, I consider an economy with only one research activity and one ordinary production activity
throughout the paper, but the model can be easily extended to the case with multiple activities.
3.3 Integrated Arrangement
Consider the case where the manager is successful in hiring a talented scientist and suppose that
the scientist is diligent in his work.6 In this case, sR ∈ {s, 0} and sP ∈ {s + s, s} at date t = 2.
Accordingly, there are four possible states of the world each of which can be summarized by a
triplet s = (S, sR, sP ), where S = sR+sP denotes the aggregate revenue. In what follows, I will
sometimes refer to S as “aggregate output” and sR and sP as “individual components of output”.
Figure 2 shows the probability distribution over date t = 2 revenues.
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Figure 2: Probability Distribution of Date t = 2 Revenues
To understand this “probability tree” suppose that at date t = 2 we are in state HL (i.e. high
research output but low ordinary production output). In this case, sR = s and sP = s indicating
6It is enough to consider this scenario since all other cases require the use of dominated strategies at least by one
agent and hence cannot arise as an equilibrium outcome.
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that (i) the production engineer was successful in his routine task but did not come up with an
invention, and (ii) the scientist is talented, has exerted effort, and generated an invention (recall
that untalented scientists as well as shirking talented scientists always produce 0). Furthermore,
one can infer from these two observations that the manager has exerted high effort in finding a
talented scientist. Other outcomes can be interpreted similarly. Note that in the case where both
the scientist and production engineer make inventions (state HH) the aggregate revenue is taken
to be S = s + s rather than S = s + 2s. This is because I assume that only one invention can
be implemented at a time.7 In this case, aggregate revenue, S, is the same in states HH , HL and
LH and equal to s+ s. This equality of aggregate revenues in multiple (i.e. at least two, but not
necessarily three) states will play an important role in the analysis that follows.
3.3.1 Information Structure and the Timing of Moves
There are three incentive problems in the model. First, the scientist’s problem, which results
from the unobservability of his effort choice. The second and third are the manager’s incentive
problems. On the one hand, the manager’s decision about whether to work hard in hiring a
talented scientist at date t = 1 is not observed by the principal. On the other hand, while the
aggregate revenue, S, from the enterprise at date t = 2 is observed by both the manager and the
principal, the individual components, sR and sP , of aggregate revenue are the manager’s private
information.8 In particular, in those situations where there is an invention, the principal cannot
observe the specific worker that produced the invention. This potentially creates an additional
asymmetry of information between the principal and the manager at date t = 2 that is above and
beyond implied by the unobservability of efforts at date t = 1. Finally, the production engineer’s
labor is observable and thus there is no incentive problem for him.
I assume that the contracts signed between the manager and workers at date t = 1 are ob-
servable by the principal.9 Observability of contracts means that the principal has the power to
decide about both the manager’s contract and the contract that would be signed between the man-
7Although this assumption is a sensible one, it is not essential: The main results of the paper are the same even
when S = s+ 2s in state HH .
8Workers are assumed to know their own individual outputs, and they may or may not know the aggregate output
-it is of no import to the analysis.
9This is because I do not consider agency problems arising from possibilities for side-contracting between various
participants, or issues relating to the allocation of contracting capacity -circumstances under which explicit consid-
eration of stage-by-stage contracts would be indispensable. See, for example, Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo
(1998) for a model in which second-stage contracts are not observed by the principal.
13
ager and the workers. Therefore, we can think of the principal as directly signing contracts not
only with the manager but also with the workers. Because the solution of the model is based on
and considerably simplified by this observation, I state it as a lemma.
Lemma 1 The two-tier contracting problem that takes place between the principal and manager
at date t = 0 and between the manager and workers at date t = 1 is equivalent to a grand
contracting problem that takes place between the principal and all the agents at date t = 0.
This is a well-known result in the theory of agency and hence the proof is omitted. The
intuition is that the principal has the power to “punish” the manager should the manager be
caught having written a contract with workers that is not desired by the principal. When contracts
are observable, the principal can always detect such deviation ex post, and hence the manager
rationally chooses not to deviate ex ante in order to avoid punishment.
As in standard principal-agent problems, the unobservability of the manager and scientist’s
efforts implies that contracts cannot be conditioned on effort. Thus, the principal must base
agents’ compensation on the outcomes of their effort, that is, (S, sR, sP ). Since the principal
cannot observe the individual components, sR and sP , of output, however, the best she can do is
to rely on the manager to report the state to her. Let s˜ = (S˜, s˜R, s˜P ) denote this report.10
The timing of moves of different participants is as follows:
• At date t = 0, the principal and all agents sign a comprehensive contract specifying how
the contracting parties will be compensated as a function of the manager’s report s˜ at date
t = 2. The principal makes the ex ante contractual offer to all the agents.
• Once the contract is signed and investments IR and IP are made, the manager chooses how
much effort to exert (i.e. chooses eM ∈ {L,H}) in finding a talented scientist at date t = 1.
• Following the manager’s choice, and upon employment, the scientist decides whether to
work hard (i.e. chooses eR ∈ {L,H}). The production engineer supplies labor.
• Outcomes are realized at date t = 2 and the manager decides whether to report the true
state of the world.
• Finally, all parties are compensated according to the contract signed at date t = 0.
10Throughout the text, managerial reports are denoted with tilde (such as s˜). Both random variables and their
realizations are denoted without tilde (such as s).
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3.3.2 Feasible Contracts
Throughout the paper I assume that contracting parties can commit to a long-term contract. Every
agent’s compensation (including that of the manager himself) depends on the manager’s report,
s˜ = (S˜, s˜R, s˜P ). Provided that the manager’s report reflects the true state at date t = 2, there is
no loss of generality in considering optimal compensation contracts for each agent separately. In
the next subsection, I provide a condition that ensures truthful-reporting by the manager.
1. The manager’s compensation contract: The manager is induced to work hard at date t = 1
if he is rewarded at date t = 2 for revenue realizations that are indicative of high research
performance. Moreover, the manager is induced to report the true state at date t = 2 if he
is paid sufficiently highly in those states where he might have an incentive to misreport.
2. The scientist’s compensation contract: The scientist is induced to work hard at date t = 1 if
he is rewarded at date t = 2 for high research revenue realizations and punished otherwise.
3. The production engineer’s compensation contract: Because the engineer has no incentive
problem, he is willing to supply labor as long as he gets at least his outside option.
A grand contract, therefore, is a 3-dimensional vector t(s˜) =
(
tM(s˜), tR(s˜), tP (s˜)
)
for each
state, where ti(s˜) denotes agent i’s payment contingent on the manager’s report, s˜. A contract
can also be expressed as a vector of contingent utilities induced by contingent payments, u(s˜) =(
uM(s˜), uR(s˜), uP (s˜)
)
, where ui(s˜) ≡ ui(t(s˜)) for i = M,R, P . I adopt the latter formulation
in the paper since it is more convenient. For future use, let h(·) denote the inverse of u(·).11
3.3.3 The Contracting Problem
The principal faces a two-tier agency problem: She must provide the right incentives for the
manager while also providing the right incentives for the scientist. The key friction is that the
principal cannot observe the individual components of aggregate revenue, which otherwise would
provide her with signals about the manager’s hiring effort and the scientist’s research effort fol-
lowing employment. To be able to write state-contingent contracts with the workers as well as
the manager, the principal must first solicit the revenue realizations from the manager, who may
in principle misreport them. Thus, a main goal of the principal is to ensure that the manager
accurately reports the realizations.
11Note that h(·)′ > 0 and h(·)′′ > 0 since u(·)′ > 0 and u(·)′′ < 0 for each and every agent.
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The grand contract offered to agents must achieve three objectives. First, it must induce all
agents to participate at date t = 0. Second, it must provide incentives for the manager and
scientist to exert the right amounts of effort at date t = 1. Finally, it must induce the manager to
report the true state of the world at date t = 2. As stated earlier, we can consider each agent’s
compensation contract separately. In each case, the optimization problem of the principal can
be set up as a cost minimization problem. I begin with the manager. The manager’s optimal
compensation contracts solves the following problem:
[P1] : CM ≡ min
uMj
rHph(u
M
HH)+rH(1−p)h(uMHL)+(1−rH)ph(uMLH)+(1−rH)(1−p)h(uMLL)
s. t. rHpuMHH + rH(1− p)uMHL + (1− rH)puMLH + (1− rH)(1− p)uMLL − ψH ≥ u
rHpu
M
HH + rH(1− p)uMHL + (1− rH)puMLH + (1− rH)(1− p)uMLL − ψH
≥ rUpuMHH + rU(1− p)uMHL + (1− rU)puMLH + (1− rU)(1− p)uMLL − ψL
uMHH = u
M
HL = u
M
LH
where CM denotes the expected cost of employing the manager, and where uMj = u
M(s˜j) and s˜j
is the manager’s report in state j ∈ {HH,HL,LH,LL} at date t = 2.
The first condition is the standard participation constraint and ensures that the manager gets
at least his reservation utility by accepting the contract. The second is the manager’s incentive-
compatibility constraint which ensures that he finds in his interest to work hard (i.e. to choose
eM = H rather than eM = L) in finding a talented scientist at date t = 1.
The last condition, on the other hand, is the manager’s no-state-misrepresentation constraint
(NSM constraint) and deserves greater discussion. It guarantees that the manager does not have
an incentive to misrepresent states in his report to the principal at date t = 2. The possibility
of state-misrepresentation arises because the manager has an informational advantage over the
principal with regard to the realizations of the individual components of output, sR and sP , in
statesHH ,HL, and LH .12 In particular, the manager knows that the principal cannot distinguish
states HH , HL, and LH since the only performance signal observed by her is the realization of
aggregate output, S, and S is equal in these states (S = s+s). It is possible, then, for the manager
to manipulate the principal about the true state if he derives a private benefit from doing it.
In order to see whether the manager would in fact have a tendency to misrepresent states, it is
helpful to first imagine a world where there is no asymmetry of information between the principal
12Even though the principal cannot observe the realizations of sR and sP in state LL either, she can perfectly
infer them from S, since S = s can arise only if sR = 0 and sP = s.
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and manager regarding the realizations of sR and sP (We still maintain the unobservability of
efforts). In such a (second-best) world, the principal can identify the true state perfectly at date
t = 2, and hence can easily write state-contingent contracts with agents at date t = 0. It is easy
to see from Figure 2 that the scientist’s optimal contract would prescribe a high compensation in
statesHH andHL and a low compensation in statesLH andLL, while the production engineer’s
optimal contract would be a constant payment in all states. The manager would also be paid a high
a compensation in states HH and HL and low in others since success by the scientist indicates
that the manager was diligent in hiring a talented scientist. Let us call this set of contracts the
optimal second-best grand contract.
Unfortunately, the world is more complicated when the only performance signal available to
the principal is the realization of aggregate output. In particular, the optimal second-best grand
contract would run into serious problems. To see this, note that if the principal is unable to
distinguish states HH , HL, and LH , then the manager would want to claim at date t = 2 that
the true state is HH or HL whenever the actual state is LH . In other words, the manager would
never accept that the research activity was unsuccessful unless the state of the world is LL. This
state-misrepresentation would give the appearance that both the manager and the scientist are
successful more often than “normal”. However, this would potentially reduce the principal’s
expected profits since expected revenues are unaffected by misrepresentation but expected costs
are likely to be higher.13 In order to prevent misrepresentation, therefore, the NSM constraint
prescribes constant utility (equivalently, payment) for the manager in states HH , HL, and LH .
Given that the manager truthfully reports the individual revenue realizations, it is straight-
forward for the principal to write contracts with both the scientist and production engineer. The
scientist’s optimal contract is the solution to the problem:
[P2] : CR ≡ min
uRj
rHph(u
R
HH)+rH(1−p)h(uRHL)+(1−rH)ph(uRLH)+(1−rH)(1−p)h(uRLL)
s. t. rHpuRHH + rH(1− p)uRHL + (1− rH)puRLH + (1− rH)(1− p)uRLL − ψH ≥ u
rHpu
R
HH + rH(1− p)uRHL + (1− rH)puRLH + (1− rH)(1− p)uRLL − ψH
≥ rLpuRHH + rL(1− p)uRHL + (1− rL)puRLH + (1− rL)(1− p)uRLL − ψL
13In a model where effort is a continuous variable and success probability is a continuous function of effort,
expected revenues might even go down, further compounding the principal’s problem. To see this, note that if both
the manager and scientist expect a high reward more often than normal, this might reduce their ex ante incentives to
exert effort, lower effort in turn leads to a lower success probability, and hence a lower expected revenue.
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where CR denotes the expected cost of employing the scientist, and where uRj = u
R(s˜j) and s˜j is
the manager’s report in state j at date t = 2. Here, the optimization is subject to the participation
and incentive-compatibility constraints for the scientist.
Finally, the production engineer’s optimal contract solves the following problem:
[P3] : CP ≡ min
uPj
rHph(u
P
HH)+rH(1−p)h(uPHL)+(1−rH)ph(uPLH)+(1−rH)(1−p)h(uPLL)
s. t. rHpuPHH + rH(1− p)uPHL + (1− rH)puPLH + (1− rH)(1− p)uPLL ≥ u
where CP and uPj are defined analogously with the previous cases.
Before characterizing the solution to the contracting problem under integration, I describe the
economic environment under specialization.
3.4 Specialized Arrangement
I now turn to the case where research is separated from ordinary production. I should emphasize
that the technological structure (i.e. activities), agents’ attitudes towards risk and effort, and the
timing of moves are identical to that of the previous section. The probability distribution over
date t = 2 revenues is still given by the probability tree in Figure 2. Moreover, Lemma 1 applies
here without any change as well. The only difference with respect to the previous section is the
structure of information which arises as a result of the change in the assignment of tasks to the
manager. Since now the manager is responsible only for research, he only knows the performance
of this activity at date t = 2. Because the research activity has two possible outcomes that are
distinct (i.e. s 6= 0), the principal can determine the true state simply by observing the output.
Therefore, it becomes impossible for the manager to manipulate the principal about the true state;
in other words, managerial state-misrepresentation is no longer an issue.
Under specialization, we need to consider two separate contracting problems. The first is that
occurs between the principal on the one hand, and the manager and scientist on the other. Like
before, we invoke Lemma 1 and reduce the two-tier contracting problem into a grand contracting
problem that takes place between the principal and both agents at date t = 0. Furthermore, since
state-misrepresentation is not an issue, we can consider each agent’s optimal contract separately.
In this environment, the principal’s goal is to get the manager to hire a talented scientist and the
scientist to work hard in generating inventions. Accordingly, the optimal contract offered to the
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agents is designed to ensure that both agents participate at date t = 0 and that they hard work at
date t = 1. Thus, the manager’s optimal compensation contract is the solution to the problem:
[P4] : CM ≡ min
uMj
rHh(u
M
H )+(1−rH)h(uML )
s. t. rHuMH + (1− rH)uML − ψH ≥ u
rHu
M
H + (1− rH)uML − ψH ≥ rUuMH + (1− rU)uML − ψL
where CM denotes the expected cost of employing the manager, and where uMj = u
M(s˜j) and
s˜j is the manager’s report in state j = H,L at date t = 2. Note that the indexation of states
is slightly different here. For example, j = H denotes the state in which the scientist, and by
implication the manager, is successful. Thus, state j = H corresponds to states HH and HL
under integration. Similarly, j = L denotes the state in which the manager is unsuccessful, and
hence corresponds to states LH and LL under integration.
Given the manager’s (truthful) report, the scientist’s optimal contract solves the problem:
[P5] : CR ≡ min
uRj
rHh(u
R
H)+(1−rH)h(uRL)
s. t. rHuRH + (1− rH)uRL − ψH ≥ u
rHu
R
H + (1− rH)uRL − ψH ≥ rLuRH + (1− rL)uRL − ψL
where CR and uRj are defined analogously with the above problem.
The second contracting problem we need to consider under specialization is the one that
occurs between the principal and production engineer. The engineer’s optimal contract solves:
[P6] : CP ≡ min
uPj
ph(uPH)+(1−p)h(uPL)
s. t. puPH + (1− p)uPL ≥ u
where CP and uPj are defined analogously with the previous cases. Here, j = H (j = L) denotes
the state in which the production engineer generates an invention (does not generate an invention),
and it corresponds to states HH and LH (HL and LL) under integration.
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3.5 Comparison of the Organizational Arrangements
3.5.1 Characterizing the Optimal Compensation Contracts
In this section, I characterize the optimal contracts under the integrated and specialized arrange-
ments. Note that the principal solves convex programming problems under both organizational
arrangements. To see this, observe that her objective function in each cost minimization problem
is strictly convex in the utility levels as it is the sum of strictly convex functions. Moreover, the
constraints are linear in utility levels. As a result, the Kuhn-Tucker first order conditions (FOC)
yield necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality. Moreover, the solution to the FOC is
unique in each case since the agents’ utility functions are strictly concave.14
The following lemma characterizes the manager’s optimal compensation contract under each
organizational arrangement.
Lemma 2 The Manager’s Optimal Compensation Contracts
Under the assumptions stated earlier, the manager’s optimal compensation contracts under inte-
gration and specialization are given, respectively, by
uM =
{
u+ ψH
rH
in states HH, HL, LH
u− ( p
1−p)
ψH
rH
in state LL
and,
uM =
{
u+ ψH
rH
in states HH and HL
u in states LH and LL.
Lemma 2 reports that there is a key difference in the compensation contracts of the manager
under the two organizational arrangements: While his compensation depends simultaneously
on the scientist’s and production engineer’s performances under integration, it depends only on
the performance of the scientist under specialization. In particular, the manager receives a high
reward when there is an invention either by the scientist and/or the production engineer under
integration, but he gets a high reward only when the invention is produced by the scientist under
14The assumption that the manager is risk averse is crucial: If the manager is risk-neutral, the principal can
implement the informationally efficient outcome by offering properly designed linear contracts. The scientist and
production engineer, by contrast, can be made risk-neutral without affecting the qualitative results of the paper.
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specialization. Thus, specialization enables the principal to decouple the manager’s compensa-
tion from the performance of the production engineer and to tailor it to the performance of the
scientist only. This is desirable from the point of view of optimal incentive provision since the
manager can affect the outcome of the research activity (by hiring a talented scientist) but not
the outcome of the ordinary production activity. As is well known, an economic agent should
not be made accountable for events over which he/she has no control because it does not help
with informational problems and generally worsens incentives.15 In the next subsection, I show
that this desirable feature of the specialization contract increases the principal’s expected profits
under specialization relative to that under integration.
The following lemma characterizes the optimal compensation contracts of the scientist and
engineer under the integrated and specialized arrangements.
Lemma 3 The Scientist’s and Engineer’s Optimal Compensation Contracts
Under the assumptions stated earlier, optimal compensation contracts of both the scientist and
production engineer are identical under the two organizational arrangements. In both cases, the
scientist’s optimal compensation contract is given by
uR =
{
u+ ψH
rH
in states HH and HL
u in states LH and LL
and, the production engineer’s optimal compensation contract is given by
uP = u in every state.
Lemma 3 reports that the optimal compensation contracts of the scientist and production
engineer are independent of organizational arrangements: In both cases, the scientist is given a
high compensation when he is successful and a low compensation otherwise, and the production
engineer is always given a flat compensation. It is easy to see why the agents’ contracts are
the same across arrangements: Since managerial misrepresentation never occurs in equilibrium
under either organizational arrangement, managerial reports reflect the true output of each agent
in both cases, allowing the principal to base each agent’s compensation on his true output.
15The formal version of this point is Holmstrom (1979)’s sufficient statistic result according to which an economic
agent’s optimal compensation is based on a sufficient statistic about the agent’s unobserved actions.
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3.5.2 The Choice of Organizational Mode
We are now ready to compare the principal’s expected profits under the two organizational ar-
rangements and determine her preferred mode of organization. Let ΠI and ΠS denote, respec-
tively, the expected profits under the integrated and specialized arrangements. That is, let
ΠI = SI − CI − (IP + IR),
and
ΠS = SS − CS − (IP + IR),
where SI and SS denote the expected revenues, and CI and CS denote the expected payments
to all agents under integration and specialization, respectively. Note that SI = SS = S∗ (where
S∗ = (p + (1 − p)rH)s + s) since the distribution of revenues is not affected by the organiza-
tional change. Hence, if there is a difference in expected profits, this must be reflected entirely
in expected total costs.16 Moreover, since the optimal compensation contracts of the scientist
and production engineer are the same under both organizational arrangements, the difference in
expected profits depends only on the difference between expected payments to managers:
ΠS − ΠI = CMI − CMS ,
where CMI and CMS are given by problems [P1] and [P4], respectively. The following propo-
sition summarizes the first main result of the paper.
Proposition 1 Under the assumptions stated earlier, ΠS ≥ ΠI . Moreover, ΠS > ΠI if and only if
p > 0. That is, the principal is always weakly better off under specialization, and is strictly better
off if and only if the production engineer has a positive probability of generating an invention.
The intuition for this result has already been largely provided in the previous subsection. The
basic idea is that under integration the principal encounters an uncertainty concerning the source
of the invention. Specifically, when there is an invention, it may have been developed by the sci-
entist or the production engineer. This puts the principal at an informational disadvantage relative
to the manager, and thus creates an additional agency problem in the contracting environment.
When research is separated from ordinary production, the ambiguity concerning the source of the
invention disappears, and the principal can always be certain that the manager’s reports reveal the
16This is a general feature of the class of principal-agent models in which the marginal distribution of outputs is
independent of the underlying information structure. See Grossman and Hart (1983) for more on this point.
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true state of the world. Therefore, it becomes easier for the principal to provide simultaneously
the right kinds of incentives for the manager and scientist. If, on the other hand, the production
engineer cannot come up with ideas (that is, if p = 0), there is no benefit to having the manager
specialize -both organizational arrangements generate the same return to the principal.
4 Introducing Capital Market Imperfections
The analysis so far made the implicit assumption that capital markets were perfect in the sense
that specialized research ventures could “freely” raise external finance at the market interest rate
(normalized to zero thus far). However, a number of reasons might make it more difficult for such
ventures to attract funds from external capital markets.17 First, specialized research ventures
require substantial upfront resources but do not generate cash flows for a long time. Second,
research ventures are typically surrounded by substantial uncertainty concerning their potential
outcomes. Finally, most of the assets of a research venture is intangible and hence cannot be
used as collateral. All of these issues potentially reduce the willingness of suppliers of capital
to provide financing to such ventures. In extreme situations, these difficulties may even cause
credit-rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).18
In this section, I relax this assumption in order to study the effects of capital market imper-
fections on the choice of organizational form. To this end, I reinterpret the static (i.e. one-period)
model of the previous sections as the reduced form of a multi-period model. Thus, I explicitly
take into account the fact that R&D, unlike routine production, takes a long time before gener-
ating any returns. Rather than presenting a full-blown presentation and solution of the modified
model, I only provide enough structure that will allow me to make my point. Accordingly, sup-
pose now that it takes one period (i.e. several years) for the research activity to bear fruit, if any.
In particular, research generates nothing in the current period (t = 0), but generates x in the next
period (t = 1) and thereafter if successful, and zero if unsuccessful. The ordinary production
activity always produces x in the current period, and produces x+x in the next period and there-
after if lucky, and only x if unlucky. Because state-contingent period cash flows are constant for
17See Gompers and Lerner (2006) for an extensive discussion of these reasons.
18Rajan and Zingales (2003a) discuss some of the recent developments in financial markets that have to some
extent reduced some of the problems mentioned in this paragraph. They argue that more data on potential borrowers
is now available and is more timely, and that there have been improvements in accounting disclosure which have re-
sulted in greater borrower transparency. Consequently, the ability of financial institutions in assessing and spreading
risks has increased resulting in lower costs for potential borrowers.
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both activities starting from period t = 1, the model is essentially a two-period model with cash
flows given by
xR =

0 at t = 0
R
R−1x at t = 1 if successful
0 at t = 1 if unsuccessful
and
xP =

x at t = 0
R
R−1(x+ x) at t = 1 if lucky
R
R−1x at t = 1 if unlucky
where R denotes the gross interest rate.19 The probabilities of success and luck are the same as
before.
My analysis here will focus on the contrast between the period t = 0 financing needs of an
integrated firm and a specialized firm. Therefore, to keep things simple, I assume that agency
problems occur only in period t = 1. In this case, each agent’s problem is to maximize expected
utility given by u(c0) + βE(u(c1) − ψ(e1)), where ct is compensation in period t = 0, 1, e1 is
effort in period t = 1, and β ∈ (0, 1) is the common discount factor (inverse of the gross interest
rate, R).20 The principal maximizes expected profits Π0 + (1/R)EΠ1. The timing of events is
similar to that in Section 3, except for the additional time period that must elapse before any
invention can be produced. Since it is common knowledge that the output of the research activity
is zero and that of ordinary production is always x in period t = 0, managerial reports in this
period are immaterial, and thus it suffices to consider only period t = 1 reports in the contracting
problem. Given the manager’s report, the (grand) contract offered to agents must be designed
to induce (i) the agents to participate in both periods, (ii) the manager and scientist to exert the
right amount of effort at (the beginning of) period t = 1, and (iii) the manager to report the true
state of nature at (the end of) period t = 1. Note that since there is no agency problem in period
t = 0, an agent will participate when u0 ≥ u; equivalently, c0 ≥ u−1(u) = h(u).
19Note that we have s = 1R−1x and s =
1
R−1x.
20I use c to denote compensation rather than t in order to avoid confusion with the time index. Also, the time
periods here should be thought of as encompassing the “dates” and “stages” of the static model of previous sections.
24
Given this setup, it is straightforward to characterize the equilibrium of the principal-agent
game played among the participants. For the time being, assume that specialized research ven-
tures face the same cost, R, of raising funds as integrated ventures (perfect capital markets). In
this case, the present discounted value of cash flows are identical under both arrangements. More-
over, the principal’s agent-specific cost-minimization problems are still given by [P1] through
[P6] of Section 3, except we now have to consider an additional participation constraint (i.e.
period t = 0 constraint stated above) in each problem, and think of the principal-agent game
of the previous sections as occurring in period t = 1 in the multiperiod version of the model.
Accordingly, optimal period t = 0 compensation contracts of agents in the multiperiod model are
given by c0 = h(u) for each agent, and optimal period t = 1 compensation contracts are given
by Lemmas 2 and 3 of the previous section. It follows then that it is still more difficult for the
principal to motivate the manager under integration since the problem of state-misrepresentation
is present here as well. Therefore, if specialized research ventures can raise funds at the same
cost as integrated ventures, then the specialization is still the preferred mode of organization (i.e.
Proposition 1 carries over).
This result does not extend to the case where capital market imperfections prevent specialized
research ventures from raising funds as easily as integrated ventures. To see this, let RB and R
denote the price of a borrowed dollar of funds faced by a research venture and an integrated
venture, respectively. For simplicity, assume that for an integrated firm the opportunity cost of an
internally generated dollar, RL, is equal to the price it faces in external capital markets; that is, let
RL = R. The key assumption I make here is that, in the presence of capital market imperfections,
the cost of a unit of funds borrowed by a firm is a strictly decreasing function of the (tangible)
collateral, call it Λ, a firm can put up in period t = 0. Since the research activity does not generate
anything in the first period, Λ = 0 for a research firm. By contrast, Λ = x > 0 for an integrated
firm thanks to ordinary production revenues. In this case, RB > R since 0 < x.
Now, consider the integrated arrangement. Assuming first period cash flows are sufficiently
high,21 an integrated firm can compensate the manager and workers out of ordinary production
cash flows, and hence does not have to resort to external financing. This implies that future prof-
its are discounted at the interest rate R in this case. Next, consider the specialized arrangement.
Since first period cash flows of an ordinary production firm are always positive and sufficiently
21Formally, the condition is x ≥ 3h(u), since the participation of each agent requires a compensation of h(u) in
period t = 0. When x < 3h(u), the firm will have to raise at least some money from external markets. Nothing
would change under this alternative situation since RL = R.
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high, the production engineer can be compensated using internal funds. By contrast, first period
cash flows are always zero for a research firm, and hence it is impossible to compensate the man-
ager and scientist unless one resorts to external financing. Therefore, while the future ordinary
production profits are discounted at rate R, research profits are discounted at the higher rate RB.
This, in turn, implies that expected profits under specialization are discounted at a rate that is
between R and RB. Consequently, the value to the principal of the specialized arrangement di-
minishes as the wedge between RB and R increases, and for RB high enough specialization may
cease to be the preferred mode of organization. These arguments are formalized in the following
proposition, and Figure 3 illustrates the proposition by means of a simple diagram.
Proposition 2 Under the assumptions stated earlier, there exists a borrowing rate RB∗ such that
• ΠS > ΠI when RB < RB∗,
• ΠS = ΠI when RB = RB∗, and
• ΠS < ΠI when RB > RB∗.
That is, the principal’s preferred mode of organization is specialization (integration) when the
borrowing rate is sufficiently low (high).
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Figure 3: Discounted profits as a function of the borrowing rate
Note that in the present model, the wedge between the borrowing rate, RB, and the market
rate, R, is a measure of imperfections in capital markets. That is, capital markets are more
imperfect when the difference between RB and R is larger. Therefore, an equivalent reading
of Proposition 2 is that integration (specialization) is the preferred mode of organization when
capital markets are sufficiently imperfect (perfect).
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5 Linking Theory with Empirical Evidence
Propositions 1 and 2 together shed some light on the costs and benefits of specialization in re-
search environments with multi-level agency problems. Specialization is desirable if capital mar-
kets are sufficiently perfect because it reduces multi-level agency problems between the suppliers
of capital on the one hand, and top managers of innovative enterprises and their employees on
the other. In the presence of capital market imperfections, however, costs of specialization may
potentially outweigh its benefits. The reason is that specialized research enterprises require sub-
stantial upfront resources without generating cash flows for a long time, and this makes them
heavily dependent on external finance. When capital markets are not sufficiently mature, the high
cost of external funds makes it more difficult to start and run specialized innovative ventures. In
extreme instances, capital market imperfections may make these ventures totally infeasible.
The situation is quite different for an integrated firm. Even if the research unit does not
quickly generate cash flows, production revenues may be used to subsidize research.22 As such,
an integrated firm essentially has access to an internal capital market through which financial syn-
ergies such as cross-subsidization of various units can be utilized. This implies that an integrated
firm is less vulnerable to the effects of imperfections in external capital markets.
These results can be used to generate a number of interesting predictions. One important
prediction of the model is that we should observe the dominance of established large corporations
in innovation (and R&D) when capital markets are sufficiently imperfect, but that this dominance
should weaken as capital markets improve.23 This prediction bears out empirically in several
different contexts. Although a detailed empirical analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, it is
instructive to consider a few examples.
1. The dramatic growth of the U.S. venture capital since the late 1970’s (a significant develop-
ment in capital markets) and the accompanied explosion of innovation produced by small
companies is a case in point. Even a casual observation suggests that a disproportionate
share of pathbreaking inventions in biotechnology, semiconductors, hard disk drives, mini-
computers, software, and the internet has come out of small venture-backed companies.
Examples of such companies include Cisco, Seagate, Sun Microsystems, Oracle, Compaq,
22There is ample evidence that corporations do indeed operate such cross-subsidies. See, for example, Stein
(1997).
23The fact that developments in capital markets pose a threat to large corporations is also argued, among others,
by Stein (1997) and Rajan and Zingales (2003a,b).
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Google, eBay, Amazon.com, Genentech, Amgen, and countless others.
It is possible to get a rough quantitative magnitude of this change. In an aggregate industry
level study, Kortum and Lerner (2000) find a dollar of venture capital to be 3.1 times more
potent in stimulating patenting than a dollar of corporate R&D between 1983 and 1992.
They also find that venture-backed firms are more likely to have previous patents cited
and engage in frequent and protracted litigation of both patents and trade secrets than non-
venture-backed firms -all indicators of patent quality. Their estimates therefore suggest that
venture capital, even though it averaged 2.92 percent of corporate R&D from 1983 to 1992,
is responsible for about 8 percent of industrial innovations in that decade.24 Considering
the fact that the venture capital to R&D ratio was only 0.36 percent during 1965 to 1979,
and assuming that the potency of venture funding remained roughly constant during 1965
to 1992, one arrives at the conclusion that venture capital must have accounted for a mere
1 percent of innovations during this earlier period.
2. The relative decline of the importance of large corporations in innovation is perhaps more
readily apparent in R&D expenditures. Data collected by the U.S. National Science Foun-
dation (NSF) show that the share of U.S. industrial R&D performed by small firms (i.e.
firms with less than 500 employees) has grown almost steadily from less than 5 percent
in 1980 to about 19 percent in 2003. Although it would be a stretch to argue that the de-
velopments in capital markets, such as the growth of venture capital, are the sole reason
behind this change, they are undoubtedly among the main factors contributing to it. Take
biotechnology, for instance, which is an industry that is extremely dependent on external
finance and where substantial venture investments have been made in the recent decades.
NSF data show that the share of biotech R&D performed by small firms increased from
under 3 percent in 1984 to roughly 40 percent in 2003. During the same period, venture in-
vestments in biotechnology rose roughly ten-fold, from $766 million in 1980-84 to $7882
million in 2000-02 (in 2002 dollars).
3. If one starts from the observation that capital markets and, in particular, venture capital
is less developed in Europe and Japan than in the U.S., this prediction implies that (i) in
these countries innovation should take place more in large corporations than in small firms
(potentially backed by venture capital), and as a result (ii) Europe and Japan should have
24Hirukawa and Ueda (2008) show that this positive impact continued to be present and even became stronger in
the late 1990’s. Tykvova (2000), on the other hand, provides evidence that similar results hold for German data.
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lower innovative performance than the U.S.. I am constrained by the lack of necessary
cross-country data to come up with numerical figures, but the fragmented evidence avail-
able suggests that this is likely the case (see, for example, Bottazzi and Da Rin, 2003;
Bottazzi, 2004; Romain and van Pottelsberghe, 2004). The prediction of the model is also
broadly in line with the empirical finding of Rajan and Zingales (1998) who show, in a
cross-section of countries in the 1980’s, that the growth in the number of new establish-
ments is significantly higher in industries dependent on external finance when the economy
is financially developed.
To see another prediction of the model note that propositions 1 and 2 implicitly assume
that economies of scope are not present between research and ordinary production activities.
If economies of scope exist, then one would expect integration to be preferred over a wider range
of parameter values; in particular, the cutoff borrowing rate, RB∗, would be smaller in Proposi-
tion 2. This suggests that specialization in innovation is more likely to occur in industries where
there is less complementarity between new innovative ideas and existing production activities.
As such, developments in financial markets are likely to increase specialization in such indus-
tries to a greater extent. The prevalence of specialized research firms in frontier industries such
as biotechnology and information technology and the fact that a substantial fraction of venture
investments is concentrated in these industries appear to be consistent with this prediction.
Another prediction of the model becomes visible if the model is extended to the case where
there are multiple firms under each organizational arrangement and allow heterogeneity in the
profitability of different firms. In this case, clearly only those research firms with sufficiently
high expected returns can raise external funds; capital market imperfections prevent many other
firms with potentially positive net present-value projects from attracting funds. As the minimum
rate of return sought by investors goes down as capital markets improve, however, firms with
lower expected returns should also be able to find financing. Sahlman (1990), indeed, presents
evidence that the rates of return on venture capital declined through the 1980’s, a period during
which both the size of the venture industry and the number of companies backed by venture
capital increased.
A final implication of the model concerns the relationship between financial development
and economic growth. In particular, the model suggests a specific mechanism through which
financial development might affect growth: It increases specialization as a form of organizing
innovative activity, increased specialization in turn enhances innovation (the engine of growth in
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models of endogenous growth), which then leads to faster economic growth. This would imply
that given two countries that are identical in every respect except for their financial development,
the country with greater financial development would grow faster. This prediction is in line with
the empirical findings surveyed in Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2008).
6 The Role of Policy in Spurring Innovation
If specialization is desirable in research environments, then policies aimed at increasing the avail-
ability of capital to specialized research ventures are of critical importance. Indeed, many of the
policy initiatives undertaken in the U.S., and in many other countries around the world, are aimed
at this very goal. In the context of venture capital, one key policy initiative stands out: The 1979
amendment to the “Prudent Man Rule” governing pension fund investments.25 Prior to 1979,
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act obstructed pension fund investments in high-risk
start-up ventures, as investments in such ventures were deemed to be “imprudent”. The Depart-
ment of Labor’s clarification of the rule stated that investments will be judged prudent not by
their individual risk but by their contribution to portfolio risk. After the amendment, venture
organizations have been able to raise substantial amounts of funds without concern over the per-
ceived riskiness for pension funds. Gompers and Lerner (2006) report that in 1978, when $481
million was invested in new venture capital funds, individuals accounted for the largest share (32
percent). Pension funds supplied just 15 percent. Eight years later, when more than $4.8 billion
was invested, pension funds accounted for more than half of all contributions.
It is important to note that the 1979 amendment reflects a significant improvement in the gov-
ernment officials’ understanding of the relationship between asset diversification and risk. This
change has helped improve capital markets by allowing pension funds to invest large sums of
money in venture capital, which in turn made it possible for a greater number of specialized,
young research firms to find financing. In the present model, this change is captured by a re-
duction in the cost of funds faced by specialized research firms, that is, a reduction in RB. This
change potentially has two distinct effects on innovation, one direct and the other indirect. The
direct effect is that many positive net present value innovative projects must have been won for the
25For a detailed discussion of the importance of this policy shift for venture capital see Gompers and Lerner
(2006). Another important policy shift is the 1978 and 1981 reductions in capital gains tax rates. Poterba (1989)
argued that these tax cuts must have increased the demand for venture capital (rather than the supply) by making
entrepreneurship more attractive.
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economy, which would otherwise not be able find financing. The indirect effect also potentially
has two parts. The first is that some of the innovative projects that were previously done within
large corporations must have moved to small stand-alone companies. The second and more subtle
is the effect of venture-backed firm entry on the innovation incentives of incumbent firms in the
same industry.26 I conjecture that increased venture-backed firm entry threat is likely to have (i)
spurred innovation incentives in industries with high R&D intensity -because successful incum-
bent innovation will help prevent entry, and (ii) reduced innovation incentives in industries with
low R&D intensity -because increased entry threat will lower incumbents’ expected rents from
innovating. Given that venture capitalists invest mainly in high R&D-intensity industries (e.g.
communications, computers, electronics, biotechnology, etc.), the former effect is likely to be an
order of magnitude more important than the latter. Overall, these effects suggest a positive effect
of venture capital on innovation. Therefore, the shift in policy and the resultant improvements in
capital markets must have served to increase the overall innovative efficiency in the economy.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper develops a theoretical model to study the effectiveness of various organizational ar-
rangements in conducting innovative activities. The multi-tier agency relationships and the extent
of information problems generated by each organizational form are given special attention. It is
shown that if capital markets are perfect, then specialization is desirable since it mitigates multi-
tier agency problems. If capital markets are (sufficiently) imperfect, however, the high cost of
external finance makes specialization unattractive. In this case, integration is more attractive since
it allows the organization to exploit financial synergies whereby cheap internal funds generated
by one unit are used to cross-subsidize other units that are in need of funds (e.g. research). This
result has an interesting implication: All else equal, the division of innovation between estab-
lished companies and young, specialized firms will be determined by the extent of imperfections
in capital markets. Specifically, the more perfect the capital markets, the greater will be the share
of innovation conducted by young firms. Therefore, financial development may pose a threat
to large corporations, especially those in innovative industries, as innovative ventures are highly
dependent on external finance.
The model is then used to understand the explosion of innovation financed by the venture
capital sector in the U.S. since the late 1970’s. It is argued that the specialization implicit in ven-
26I leave the analysis of this important channel to future research.
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ture capital form of organization helps mitigate multi-tier agency problems between the suppliers
of capital, executives, and researchers/entrepreneurs, thereby producing more efficient outcomes.
This mechanism helps us better understand Kortum and Lerner (2000)’s empirical finding that
venture capital-backed firms have been more innovative, on average, than large industrial corpo-
rations in the recent decades.
The paper finally points to the role of policy for innovation. It is argued that the 1979 amend-
ment to the “prudent man rule” governing pension fund investments has helped improve capital
markets by allowing pension funds to invest large sums of money in venture capital, which in
turn made it possible for a greater number of specialized, young research firms to find financing.
Increased specialization in innovative activities, in turn, helped alleviate some of the informa-
tional and contractual problems which otherwise plagued large, multi-division corporations. The
end result has been a surge in innovative performance of the U.S. economy.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2. I begin by characterizing the manager’s optimal compensation contract under
integration. First, use the NSM constraint to rewrite problem [P1] as follows:
[P1′] : CM ≡ min
{uˆ,uˇ}
(rH+(1−rH)p)h(uˆ)+(1−rH)(1−p)h(uˇ)
s. to (rH + (1− rH)p)uˆ+ (1− rH)(1− p)uˇ− ψH ≥ u
(rH − rU)(1− p)(uˆ− uˇ) ≥ ψH − ψL
where uˆ ≡ uMHH = uMHL = uMLH and uˇ ≡ uMLL.
Let µ ≥ 0 and λ ≥ 0 denote the (negative of) Lagrange multipliers attached to the participa-
tion and incentive constraints, respectively. The Langrangian for the problem is given by
L ≡ −
[
(rH + (1− rH)p)h(uˆ) + (1− rH)(1− p)h(uˇ)
]
+ λ
[
(rH − rU)(1− p)(uˆ− uˇ)− (ψH − ψL)
]
+µ
[
(rH + (1− rH)p)uˆ+ (1− rH)(1− p)uˇ− ψH − u
]
.
Then, Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions for uˆ and uˇ are:
h′(uˆ) = µ+
(
1− r
U + (1− rU)p
rH + (1− rH)p
)
λ,
h′(uˇ) = µ− rH − r
U
1− rH λ.
Claim: Both λ > 0 and µ > 0.
Proof of claim: First, suppose that µ = 0. Then, h′(uˇ) = − rH−rU
1−rH λ ≤ 0, which is impossible
since h′(·) > 0. Second, suppose that λ = 0. Then, h′(uˆ) = h′(uˇ), implying that uˆ = uˇ. But then
the incentive constraint implies that ψH ≤ ψL, contradicting ψH > ψL.
Therefore, both the participation and incentive constraints are binding. Solving these two
constraints for uˆ and uˇ, and substituting rU = 0 and ψL = 0, we obtain:
uˆ = u+
ψH
rH
,
uˇ = u−
( p
1− p
)ψH
rH
.
Next, let’s consider the manager’s optimal compensation contract under specialization. Note
however that this is a standard two-effort and two-outcome moral hazard problem, just like the
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one under integration. Therefore, algebra analogous to that above establishes that the manager’s
optimal compensation under specialization takes the form stated in the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 3. Analogous to the proof of Lemma 2.
Proof of Proposition 1. Proof of Proposition 1. Since ΠS − ΠI = CMI − CMS , ΠS ≥ ΠI if
and only if CMI ≥ CMS . By Lemma 2, we have
CM
I
= (rH + (1− rH)p)h(uˆ) + (1− rH)(1− p)h(uˇ),
where uˆ ≡ uMHH = uMHL = uMLH and uˇ ≡ uMLL, and
CM
S
= rHh(u
M
H ) + (1− rH)h(uML ).
We also know by Lemma 2 that uˆ = uMH . Then, we can write
CM
I − CMS = (1− rH)
(
ph(uˆ) + (1− p)h(uˇ)− h(uML )
)
.
Case 1: Suppose that p = 0. Then, CMI − CMS = (1 − rH)
(
h(uˇ) − h(uML )
)
and uˇ = uML ,
implying that CMI = CMS , and therefore ΠS = ΠI .
Case 2: Suppose that p > 0. In this case, we must show ph(uˆ) + (1 − p)h(uˇ) > h(uML ). Now,
we know by Lemma 2 that the participation constraints under both integration and specialization
hold at equality. Thus, we can write
(rH + (1− rH)p)uˆ+ (1− rH)(1− p)uˇ− ψH = u,
and
rHu
M
H + (1− rH)uML − ψH = u.
Using uˆ = uMH and subtracting the second equation from the first, we obtain after some rear-
rangement
puˆ+ (1− p)uˇ = uML ,
which implies that
h(puˆ+ (1− p)uˇ) = h(uML ). (∗)
Finally, strict convexity of h(·) implies that
h(puˆ+ (1− p)uˇ) < ph(uˆ) + (1− p)h(uˇ). (∗∗)
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Conditions (∗) and (∗∗) together imply
ph(uˆ) + (1− p)h(uˇ) > h(uML ),
as was to be shown. Consequently, ΠS > ΠI .
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof of this result has already been provided in large part in the
body of the paper. As such, it suffices to provide the few remaining details. I have already argued
that a version of Proposition 1 holds in the multi-period extension of the model (see page 25).
Therefore, we have ΠS > ΠI when RB = R, for some R ≥ 0.
Let us next suppose RB = ∞. Consider first the integrated arrangement. Since RB denotes
the cost of funds for a specialized research firm, it is irrelevant for profits under integration.
Moreover, by our assumptions on parameter values (see page 11), we have ΠI > 0. Next,
consider the specialized arrangement. When RB = ∞ specialized research firms cannot raise
funds from external capital markets and therefore the research activity cannot be conducted. But
since by assumption the principal’s expected profits are at most zero when at least one activity
is not carried out (again, see page 11), we have ΠS ≤ 0. This implies, that ΠI > ΠS when
RB =∞.
Finally, suppose that RB > R, but is finite. In this case, it is possible for specialized research
firms to raise funds from capital markets, but profitability decreases as the cost of funds increases;
that is, ΠS is a decreasing function of RB. Let us hence write ΠS(RB). On the other hand, ΠI
is positive and independent of RB as before. Now, define ∆(RB) = ΠS(RB) − ΠI . We know
that (i) ∆(RB) > 0 when RB = R, for some R ≥ 0, (ii) ∆(RB) < 0 when RB = ∞, and (iii)
∆(RB) is a continuous function of RB. Then, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists
an RB∗ such that ∆(RB∗) = 0. Therefore, we have
• ΠS > ΠI when RB < RB∗,
• ΠS = ΠI when RB = RB∗, and
• ΠS < ΠI when RB > RB∗.
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